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Abstract
This paper investigates the properties of two types of cost restrictions that guaran-
tee the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies in Bayesian spatial competition
models with heterogenous firms.
1 Introduction
Aghion and Schankerman (2004) and Syverson (2004) were the first to investigate the
properties of circular city models a` la Salop (1979) with asymmetric costs. These two
articles assume a very similar Bayesian set-up (i.e. the rivals’ costs are unknown) but
adopt different restrictions to deal with the fact that when cost asymmetry is large with
respect to the transport cost parameter, a pure-strategy price equilibrium may not exist.1
On the one hand, the restriction in Syverson (2004) is such that there always exists
an indifferent consumer located between two neighboring producers, i.e. a high cost firm
facing tough competition from two low-cost neighbouring rivals has a positive market share
in any state of the world. On the other, Aghion and Schankerman (2004, AS hereafter) use
a weaker restriction, which only requires that a high-cost firm has, on average, a positive
market share.
This paper develops a theoretical analysis aimed at identifying the economic implica-
tions associated with the use of different restrictions on cost asymmetry in spatial competi-
tion models. To this purpose, we adopt the same theoretical set-up as in AS to investigate
the properties of the two types of cost restrictions we focus on. The first type arises when
aE-mail: m.alderighi@univda.it.
bCorresponding Author. E-mail: c.a.g.piga@lboro.ac.uk
1Existence problems in localized competition models date back to d’Aspremont et. al. (1979), where it
is shown that in the Hotelling set-up a pure-strategy equilibrium fails to exist when firms are too close.
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the ‘no mill-price undercutting’ condition holds (Eaton and Lipsey, 1978). This condition
implies that firms commit not to undercut their opponents, i.e. that even if profitable,
firms would not choose to charge a price that may completely exclude a rival from the
market. Our analysis is further extended by deriving the second type of cost restrictions
without relying on firms’ commitment, in line with the approaches in Vogel (2008) and
Alderighi and Piga (2008).
Our main result is that the second restriction type imposes a stricter limit on the
amount of cost asymmetry that is consistent with the existence of an equilibrium. Fur-
thermore, we show that the restriction in AS is too weak even relative to our first type, so
that in that model with positive probability a high-cost firm may have (ex-post) a negative
market share. We obtain that after imposing the first restriction type, some of their policy
recommendations are not supported by their analysis.
2 The set-up
We shall first recall AS’s model and notations. On a circumference of unitary length,
n evenly located firms produce a homogeneous good. Firms have either a high unit cost
cH or a low unit cost cL; q denotes the probability of drawing a high-cost firm; cH , cL
and q are common knowledge. Firms know their, but not their rivals’, type. On the same
circumference, a continuum of uniformly distributed consumers has mass normalized to
1. A generic consumer receives a utility u = v − pi − tdi if she buys one unit of the good
from firm i, where v is the product’s gross valuation, pi is the mill price charged by firm
i, t is the unit transport cost and di is the shortest distance of the consumer from firm i.
Let pi, pi−1 and pi+1 denote the prices charged by firm i and its two closest rivals. The
marginal consumer between i and i+ 1 (i− 1) lies at a distance xR (xL) from firm i:
xR (pi+1, pi) =
1
2n
+
1
2t
(pi+1 − pi) (1)
xL (pi−1, pi) =
1
2n
+
1
2t
(pi−1 − pi) (2)
The expected profit of firm i is given by: Πi = (pi − ci) (ExL (pi−1, pi) + ExR (pi+1, pi)).
Following AS, the expected market share of firm i, conditional on all other low- (high-)
cost firms charging the same price pL (pH), is given by:
Di (pH , pL, pi) = ExL + ExR =
1
n
+
1
t
(qpH + (1− q) pL − pi) . (3)
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Symmetry and firms’ profit maximizing behaviour imply that equilibrium prices and ex-
pected market shares are:2
pH =
t
n
+ cH − 12 (1− q) ∆c (4)
pL =
t
n
+ cL +
1
2
q∆c (5)
DH =
1
n
− 1
2t
(1− q) ∆c (6)
DL =
1
n
+
1
2t
q∆c, (7)
where ∆c = cH − cL and pH − pL = ∆c/2.
3 On cost restrictions with commitment
In this Section, we show that the condition presented in AS generally allows an excessive
amount of cost asymmetry. We start by assuming that firms commit not to undercut rivals
(Eaton and Lipsey, 1978):
Condition 1 (No mill-price undercutting) pH − pL < t/n.
To guarantee that in the AS solution both types of firms have ex-post positive market
shares, i.e. xL, xR ≥ 0, it is therefore necessary that the AS price solution satisfies
Condition 1. Therefore, we replace (4) and (5) into Condition 1, obtaining:
∆c ≤ 2 t
n
. (8)
In AS, the relevant boundary condition ensuring that (4) and (5) represent a price equi-
librium is given by DH ≥ 0 (see p. 804), which implies:
∆c ≤ 2 1
1− q
t
n
, (9)
i.e. the degree of cost asymmetry that is allowed in the AS set-up is proportional to the
parameter t/n, but it can be arbitrarily large when q is close to 1. Thus, (9) is weaker than
(8). We delve deeper into the possible implications of adopting (9) instead of (8) by first
demonstrating that DH > 0 is a weighted average of positive and negative ‘quantities’.
Then, we show that when xL < 0 and/or xR < 0, firm i’s ‘real’ market share should be
2In AS, the expressions equivalent to (4) and (5) are mis-typed; indeed, the subsequent equations, e.g.,
(6) and (7), are identical to the ones we present here.
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null, and therefore DH > 0 in (3) is misspecified (i.e. positive and negative quantities do
not cancel out).
We begin by decomposing DH into three parts in accordance with the number of low-
cost neighbours a high-cost firm may potentially face. We focus on the parameters’ range
for which (9), but not (8), is satisfied, i.e.: 2 tn < ∆c ≤ 2 tn 11−q :
1. with probability (1− q)2, firm i has two low-cost neighbours; therefore using (1) and
(2) we obtain xL (pL, pH), xR (pL, pH) < 0 and xL + xR = 1/n−∆c/2t < 0;
2. with probability 2 (1− q) q, firm i has one low-cost (e.g. i − 1) and one high-cost
neighbour (e.g. i+ 1), therefore xL < 0 and xR > 0 (or viceversa), with xL + xR =
(1/n−∆c/4t) T 0. (This case is represented in Figure 1)
3. with probability q2, firm i has no low-cost neighbours and xL + xR = 1/n.
Adding up previous results yields the expected market share of a high-cost firm reported
in (6):
DH = (1− q)2
(
1
n
− 1
2t
∆c
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸ + 2q (1− q)
(
1
n
− 1
4t
∆c
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸ + q2
1
n︸︷︷︸ ≥ 0.
< 0 T 0 > 0
(10)
Therefore, in AS, when firms’ cost asymmetry is sufficiently large, the expected market
share of a high-cost firm is the weighted average of positive and negative market shares, i.e.,
with positive probability some firms will be ex-post selling strictly non-positive quantities.
Furthermore, when (8) is violated, (10) generally misrepresents the corrected expected
market share of the high-cost firm i. To show this, assume that (pure-strategy) equilibrium
prices exist and that they are given by (4) and (5). Moveover, consider different intervals
of cost asymmetry, indexed by k = 0, 1, 2, ..:
2k
t
n
< ∆c ≤ 2 (k + 1) t
n
,
where k represents the number of high-cost neighbours needed to shield firm i, i.e., to
guarantee that a high-cost firm is not undercut by a low-cost firm located too close.
Conditional on k high-cost firms being located at the right and k high-cost firms being
located at the left of i, a (k + 1)-step neighbour is high-cost with probability q, and it is
low-cost with probability (1− q). When a (k + 1)-step neighbour is low-cost, it undercuts
all the neighbours of firm i, and therefore it competes directly with firm i. Otherwise, if
a (k + 1)-step neighbour is high-cost, the 1-step neighbour of firm i has a positive market
share and competition takes place beween that 1-step neighbour and firm i. Hence:
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1. with probability q2k, firm i is not undercut, and therefore its market share is (1− q)(
1+k
n − 12t∆c
)
+ q 1n , and
2. with probability 1− q2k, firm i is undercut and its market share is 0.
Thus, the expected market share of a high-cost firm is q2k
(
(1− q) (1+kn − 12t∆c)+ q 1n),
which coincides with (10) when k = 0, but generally differs from it, when k ≥ 1. Accord-
ingly, for k ≥ 1, (3) cannot be used to derive the expected market shares presented in (6)
and (7). Therefore (4) and (5) do not necessarily represent the equilibrium prices of the
game.
4 On some economic implications
Some of the economic policy implications in AS derived under (9) fail to hold when
(8) is imposed.3 The main point is given by the fact that AS analysis strongly relies on
the fact that with sufficient heterogeneity, aggregate profit is increasing in the degree of
competition (i.e. 1/t). In particular, in Proposition 2.(iii), AS state that competition-
enhancing policies increase aggregate profits if
(
∆c
2t
)2
> 1
n2q(1−q) (see page 820 in AS).
Because 1q(1−q) > 1, this condition violates (8), which if taken into account implies that
aggregate profit is always decreasing in the degree of competition.
Other propositions are affected by the erroneous boundary conditions. The argu-
ment parallels that for Proposition 2.(iii). An important implication of Proposition 3
hinges around the assumed divergence of interests between high- and low-cost firms,
i.e. ∂ΠH/∂t > 0 and ∂ΠL/∂t < 0. However, the latter requirement is equivalent to
∆c > 2t/ (nq), a condition which never holds under (8). Therefore, the possibility of a
low-competition political economy trap is not sustained by the analysis. Moreover, in the
analysis of entry carried out in Section 4 of AS and summarised in Proposition 6, increas-
ing the degree of competition increases the probability of entry by a low-cost firm and
reduces that of entry by a high-cost one if ∂ΠL/∂t < 0, which, as discussed above, does
not hold under (8). Finally, in the simulation of welfare effects in Section 5, AS consider
some values that are out of the boundary conditions.
3To prove that AS results continue to hold when (8) is violated entails complex computations for
deriving a new price equilibrium, that due to the discontinuity and non quasi-concavity of the pay-off
functions is likely to be in mixed strategies (Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986). This is beyond the goals of this
work.
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5 On the boundary conditions without commitment
Previous considerations have been derived while assuming that firms are committed to
Condition 1. As discussed in Alderighi and Piga (2008), if costs satisfy (8), but firms are
free to deviate from Condition 1, then computed prices are not necessarily an equilibrium,
since for some parameter ranges, a low-cost firm could profitably deviate by undercutting
their closest rivals.
The following proposition guarantees the equilibrium existence without relying on the
‘no mill-price undercutting’ assumption.
Proposition 1 When q ∈ (0, 1), equations (4) and (5) represent a symmetric Bayesian
(pure-strategy) Nash price equilibrium if:
∆c ≤ α (q) t
n
, (11)
where α (q) =
(
q + q2 + 2− q
√
6q + q2 + 5
)
/
(
q − q3 + 1) ∈ (4− 2√3, 2) and α′ (q) < 0.
Proof See Appendix.
Proposition 1 states that it is more likely to have an equilibrium when q is small. The
intuition follows from the fact that since profitable deviations mainly occur when low-cost
firms try to undercut high-cost ones, when q is small a low-cost firm has a lower incentive
to deviate because: first, the low-cost equilibrium price is smaller (with respect to the
case where q is large) and therefore undercutting yields a lower unit margin; second, the
chance of undercutting a high-cost firm and the size of its market share are smaller, so that
undercutting yields a smaller rise in expected market share. This argument also clarifies
why there are no existence problems in the standard circular model (Salop, 1979). In fact,
when costs are symmetric (∆c = 0), a pure-strategy equilibrium always exists as there are
no less-efficient firms to be undercut.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. To be an equilibrium, we check whether a player has no incentive
to deviate from its strategy. We focus on the situation in which the boundary condition (8) holds,
and we start analyzing the incentive for a firm to undercut its neighbours. Note that condition
(8) implies that by gradually lowering its price, a deviating firm first undercuts 1-step high-cost
neighbours, then 1-step low-cost neighbours, afterwards, 2-step high-cost neighbours, and so on
and so forth.
A) We start by analysing the case in which firm i charges pi ∈
(
pL − tn , pH − tn
]
, so that it
is able to undercut a 1-step neighbour only when the latter is a high-cost firm. In this case, it
is necessary to extend (3) to account for undercutting. Thus, when i + 1 is a low-cost firm, the
marginal consumer between i and i + 1 is located at the distance given by (1), and when i + 1 is
a high-cost firm, the marginal consumer is located between i and i+ 2 at the distance of:
xRR (pi+2, pi) =
1
n
+
1
2t
(pi+2 − pi) .
The marginal consumer between i and i − 2 is defined similarly: xLL (pj , pi) = xRR (pj , pi),
with j = L,H. By symmetry, the expected market share of firm i is therefore given by:
Di (pH , pL, pi) = q (q · 2xRR (pH , pi) + (1− q) · 2xRR (pL, pi)) + (1− q) · 2xR (pL, pi)
= q
[
q
(
2
n
+
pH − pi
t
)
+ (1− q)
(
2
n
+
pL − pi
t
)]
+ (1− q)
(
1
n
+
pL − pi
t
)
.
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We focus on the case that i is a low-cost firm, since in this case the incentive to deviate is
larger. Note that the profit function of i, (pi − cL)Di (pH , pL, pi), is increasing in pi, so that the
maximum deviation profit is reached when the firm sets pD = pH − tn , and obtains a unit margin
pD − cL = q+12 ∆c. Thus, the expected demand is:
Di =
q + 2
n
− (1− q) (q + 1) ∆c
2t
.
And the expected profit is:
ΠD =
q + 1
2
∆c
[
q + 2
n
− (1− q) (q + 1) ∆c
2t
]
. (12)
In order to have no incentive to deviate, ID = ΠD −ΠL < 0. Noting that ΠL = t (DL)2 and after
some simplifications we obtain: ID = − 1t
(
t
n
)2 + 12t ( tn) (q + q2 + 2)∆c − 14t (1 + q − q3) (∆c)2.
Therefore:
∆c <
[
1
q − q3 + 1
(
q + q2 + 2− q
√
6q + q2 + 5
)] t
n
. (13)
B) We now consider a case where a low-cost firm charges pDD ∈
(
pH − 2 tn , pL − tn
]
, so that
it is able to undercut both types of 1-step neighbour. Again, the profit function in the interval
is increasing in pDD, so that the maximum deviation profit is reached when the firm sets pDD =
pL − tn , and obtains a unit margin pDD − cL = q2∆c. The expected market share is:
Di =
2
n
+
1
t
(
qpH + (1− q) pL − pL + t
n
)
=
3
n
+
q
t
∆c
2
.
The incentive to deviate is hence IDD = ΠDD − ΠL = q2∆c
(
3
n +
q
t
∆c
2
) − t ( 1n + 12tq∆c)2.
Therefore, there is no incentive to deviate when ∆c ≤ 2q tn , condition that is always satisfied when
(13) holds.
C) By assuming lower deviation prices, unit margins reduce so that firms have less incentive
to deviate. Conversely, it is easy to show that firms have no unilateral incentive to increase their
prices.
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Figure 1: Market shares as computed in AS and considering undercutting.
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